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Abstract 
In 2017 the Australian Government announced a raft of measures designed to combat ‘foreign 
interference’ in the Australian political system. The measures propose new constraints on civil 
society advocacy and threaten to seriously curtail democratic rights. They form part of global 
trend towards the increased regulation of International Non-Government Organisations 
(INGOs), driven by fears of ‘foreign’ political influence. In response to the shrinking ‘civic 
space’, NGOs are defining new agendas. Recently in Australia and elsewhere NGO advocates 
have gained some traction in extending the legitimacy and scope for political advocacy. The 
new rhetoric of countering ‘foreign interference’ threatens NGO advocacy, but also creates 
new political possibilities. This article surveys the international trends and Australian contexts; 
it analyses recent legislative proposals in Australia to combat ‘foreign interference’, and 
outlines the public debate. The double standard for INGOs and multinational corporations is 
highlighted as a key theme, and the article ends with a concluding discussion about emerging 
possibilities for new political obligations for corporations in Australia.   
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Introduction 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) are the institutional bedrock of civil society, both 
domestically and internationally. The concept of the NGO as the carrier of democracy, rather 
than the political party, became established in the 1970s and 1980s through multiple struggles 
against authoritarianism. This ‘third wave’ of democratization, as Huntington, the 
conservative political scientist, called it (1991), unseated autocratic elites in Eastern Europe, 
South America and East Asia and was in large part driven by mobilisation through NGOs. 
Subsequently, in the context of globalised corporations and the emergence of new forms of 
unaccountable political authority at international levels, International NGOs (INGOs), 
aligned with social and political movements, became established channels for globalization 
and democratic engagement ‘from below’ (Steger, Goodman and Wilson 2014). Alliances of 
INGOs and movements created constituencies, constituted influence and exerted leverage: 
they exposed and stalled corporate and government initiatives, and established new forms of 
global governance and regulation (Goodman 2016).  
The international and domestic impacts of NGOs did not go unnoticed, and from the 
2000s there was a concerted effort to rein-in their power. One important claim was that 
NGOs exert political influence but are relatively unaccountable. This challenged their 
democratic legitimacy, presenting NGOs as elitist and self-interested. The challenge came 
from the ‘free market’ Right, in the form of ‘public choice’ theory that asserted a ‘free market 
of ideas’ as the precondition for optimal political decision-making, defining NGOs as an 
illegitimate distortion of formal representative politics (see Staples 2008). A parallel criticism 
of ‘NGO-ism’ came from the Left, which defined dominant NGOs and especially ‘branded’ 
INGOs as extending elite control against (and parasitic upon) genuinely democratic 
grassroots social and political movements (see Hirsch 2003). Into the 2000s the critiques 
from the Right found purchase in government attempts at imposing restrictions on NGO 
activity, as reflected in several countries, including Australia, where the Government 
embarked on a multi-faceted effort at ‘silencing dissent’ (see Hamilton and Madison 2007). 
The attempted imposition of new constraints on NGO activity has certainly threatened 
the vitality of democracy, chilling public advocacy across many countries (see successive 
reports from CIVICUS, for instance 2016). In several places, including Australia, attempted 
impositions have politicized the regulation of NGOs and produced a public backlash that in 
some instances has had the ironic effect of expanding the realm of civil society activity. This 
is an important lesson in the Australian context, where the Howard Government’s efforts to 
constrain NGOs in the 1990s and early 2000s helped to galvanise the sector, and 
subsequently forced new commitments from government agencies not to constrain NGO 
advocacy. The commonplace imposition of a ‘gag’ order for any NGOs receiving 
government funds, for instance, was contested across a range of contexts, leading to 
legislated commitments, including the 2013 ‘Not-for-profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act’ 
at the Federal level and various ‘social compacts’ to respect NGO autonomy at the State level 
(Butcher 2015). Government attempts to tighten the definition of charitable status, and hence 
constrain access to tax-deductibility, was likewise highly contested and culminated in a High 
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Court case that established the public benefit of political advocacy (the ‘AidWatch ‘ case, 
discussed below; Staples 2012; CCS Journal 3(3S) 2011).  
In the current period, the stand-off over NGO regulation has taken a new turn, which 
again may have unexpected consequences. Following the Global Financial Crisis, and the 
persistent economic downturn, a wave of openly nationalist political forces have gained 
power across several countries (Gonzalez-Vicente and Carroll 2017). This has coincided with 
something of an inter-regnum in geopolitics, with new challengers, principally China, Russia 
and India, gaining political influence. There has been increased concern about cross-national 
collaboration between nationalist forces, for instance to secure the exit of Britain from the 
EU, and to help put Donald Trump into the White House (see Dodd et al 2017; CCS Journal 
9(2) 2017). In Australia there are rising concerns about the influence of Chinese authorities, 
channeled through affiliated advocacy NGOs or think-tanks, and through direct donations to 
political parties – Chinese corporates account for the vast bulk of overseas donations to 
Australian political parties (Uhlmann 2018; Hamilton 2018). The fear of the rising powers 
has legitimised a new political concern about ‘foreign political interference’ and a related 
desire to defend the sanctity of ‘political sovereignty’. This new anti-foreigner sentiment has 
been recruited, very effectively, to the wider campaign against NGO political advocacy.  
The result, in Australia, and replicated in many other countries, is a raft of measures 
that are ostensibly designed to ‘protect’ democracy from outside interference. The rhetoric 
subsumes INGOs as potential threats to political democracy, but the effect is to constrain the 
democratic process by delimiting NGO influence, both domestic and international. In 2017, 
on introducing ‘foreign interference laws’ in Australia, the Prime Minister referred to the 
need to criminalise non-disclosure of ‘ties to a foreign principal’, as a ‘disinfectant’ for the 
political process, along with powers to ban foreign funding and political interference, to 
‘surgically’ remove risks to the democratic system (Turnbull 2017). Senator Brandis, 
Attorney-General and long-time advocate of tighter constraints on NGOs, stated his 
government was ‘committed to ensuring that our political system is free from foreign 
interference’, detailing legislation that would extend across all aspects of political life, 
covering any ‘foreign sources … seeking to influence Australia's government and political 
processes’ (Brandis 2017). The heady mix of anti-foreigner rhetoric and democratic 
sentiment may have unexpected consequences though, in terms of politicising the role of 
INGOs: there has certainly been a strong backlash in Australia (and elsewhere where similar 
proposals have been tabled). The backlash reasserts the legitimacy of international links for 
NGOs, and their importance for the political system. In the process, the assault on INGOs 
may create the foundations for a stronger challenge to nationalist populism. 
This article outlines proposed changes in the political regulation of NGOs in Australia 
and their implications. The article addresses a range of issues, across charity status, tax 
deductibility, foreign donations, and foreign influence. All have direct implications for 
domestic as well as international NGOs. In large part the Australian measures extend parallel 
initiatives underway in other countries, and this international context is addressed first by 
way of background to the Australian experience. This is followed by an overview of recent 
efforts at regulating the political activity of NGOs in Australia, and how they have been 
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countered, for the most part successfully. Governmental restrictions are found to galvanise 
the sector, inspiring a ‘collective effort to resist the government’s agenda’ (Crosbie 2017). 
This has affirmed and in some respects widened ‘civic space’. The article then analyses 
recent government efforts at constraining ‘foreign interference’, focusing on implications for 
NGOs in Australia, and outlining, again, how these measures have been very effectively 
opposed. The article echoes three other papers published in this journal, covering the Russian, 
Chinese and Indian contexts (sector into see Oleinikova 2017 and Feng 2017; and Talukdar, 
this issue), in particular their discussion of how the measures have been justified and resisted.  
An International ‘Chill’? 
The globalisation era led to an ‘explosion’ in INGO activity through the 1990s (Josselin and 
Wallace 2001, p.1). In 2002 the UNDP stated that twenty percent of the 37, 000 INGOs in 
place in 2000 had emerged since 1990, and that these had generated more than 20,000 INGO 
networks, a ‘revolution [that] parallels the rapid growth of global business over the same 
period’ (UNDP 2002, p.102). The growth continued into the 2000s, with 56,000 in place by 
2010, showing a ‘stable consolidated growth pattern’ (Kaldor et al. 2012). INGOs drew on 
their legitimacy as representatives of public opinion in confrontations with corporations and 
governments, establishing something of a ‘pro-NGO norm’ (Reimann 2006). Reflecting this, 
the Globescan global trust survey found that NGOs attract much higher levels of trust than 
either corporations or government: in 2015 nearly 80 per cent of respondents were found to 
agree that NGOs would ‘operate in the best interests of our society’ (Globescan 2015). 
Demonstrating their legitimacy, coalitions of INGOs have played a key role in global 
policymaking, exercising a ‘potential to catalyse change’ (UNDP 2002). A recent example is 
the role of INGOs in contesting the United Nations ‘Green Economy’ agenda at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2012 (Goodman and Salleh 2014). More positively, 
INGOs have become key agents in instigating and encouraging the emergence of inter-state 
normative and policy regimes (Reimann 2006). INGOs have been key players in a ‘new 
public diplomacy’ where governments exercise power with an eye to normative INGO 
agendas (Vickers 2004). Their activity has especially exposed the close regulatory relations 
between corporate interests and governments, and the creation of ‘private international law’ 
(Goodman 2014).  
In recent years an increasing number of countries have introduced specific obligations 
to rein-in the power of internationally-funded NGOs. There is a variety of preexisting 
national schemes that regulate the political role of foreign entities: the United States (US), for 
instance, bans overseas donations to political parties and has had a registration system for 
‘foreign agents’ since the 1930s. The ‘Foreign Agents Registration Act’ (which in 2018 was 
set to be more heavily enforced) requires registration for individuals and organisations, 
including corporates that act ‘in a political or quasi-political capacity’ and do so ‘under the 
control of’ foreign entities (see Jenner and Block 2018). The specific regulation of INGOs, as 
against political parties, is becoming more commonplace. In 2014 the British Government 
introduced measures preventing NGOs, dubbed ‘third party’ organisations, from receiving 
overseas funding for any spending designed to influence voters during an election campaign 
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period, and capped their total allowable spending (GoUK 2014). In doing so the UK joined 
the growing list of countries, mainly low and middle-income countries, which have imposed 
limitations on INGO political spending. Just three such countries had such limitations in 
1993; thirty-nine had restrictions in 2012. Often these are low-income countries motivated by 
concerns about political interference by INGOs from high-income countries (Dupuy et al. 
2016). In contrast, as discussed below, similar initiatives in high-income contexts are in part 
motivated by concerns about offshore interventions from those self-same middle-income 
countries, such as Russia or China. All such measures have a ‘chilling effect’ on democracy, 
including in the UK, where new rules on spending ensure that ‘many NGOs are more 
cautious about campaigning on politically contentious issues because they fear breaking the 
law or the reputational risk of vexatious complaints’ (Commission on Civil Society and 
Democratic Engagement 2014, p.10).  
Concerns about the impact of new INGO obligations on the democratic process have 
been voiced for some time, including at the United Nations. In 2013 the United Nations 
Human Rights Council approved a resolution on ‘Protecting Human Right Defenders’ that 
stated ‘no law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights on 
account of the origin of funding...’ (Human Rights Council 2013, para 9b). In a commentary 
on the resolution, Human Rights Watch asked ‘why is it wrong for NGOs to solicit financial 
support from foreign friends?’, and pointed to a double standard: ‘Bolstered by foreign funds, 
governments routinely advance their political agendas. Militaries and businesses do the same. 
Why should NGOs be singled out for restriction?’ (Human Rights Watch 2013). Since 2013, 
a wide range of agencies have taken up the issue. The Economist reported on the trend in 
2014 as follows: 'More and more autocrats are stifling criticism by barring non-governmental 
organisations from taking foreign cash’, citing Hungary, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Russia, Sudan and Venezuela (Economist 2014). In 2015 the Carnegie Foundation 
reported that: 'Just in the past two years, China, India, and Russia, along with many smaller 
countries – such as Cambodia, Hungary, and Uganda – spanning all ideological, economic, 
and cultural lines, are stepping up efforts to block foreign support for domestic civil society 
organizations’ (Carothers 2015).  
Numerous international organisations have raised concerns at the growing impacts on 
‘civic space’, including (ironically enough) the corporate-led World Economic Forum, which 
in its 2017 ‘Global Risk Report’, referred to the emerging global double standard for 
businesses and NGOs, asserting that ‘In some countries, for example, businesses and civil 
society actors have different reporting requirements – for example, civil society actors may 
be prohibited from receiving foreign donations, while businesses are encouraged to seek 
foreign investment’ (World Economic Forum 2017, para 2.2). CIVICUS made a similar point 
in its 2016 ‘Civic Space: Rights in Retreat’ report, citing Israel, India and Russia as key 
examples in the ‘onslaught on foreign funding’. Like the WEF, it highlighted ‘considerable 
hypocrisy’ where ‘governments that decry foreign support for CSOs are more than happy to 
accept foreign funding themselves, including support from donors for their national budgets, 
or by courting foreign direct investment in the private sector; indeed, the restriction of civic 
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space can in part arise because a government sees CSOs as competitors for resources' 
(CIVICUS 2016, p.5).   
Despite these concerns, the trend has been extended and deepened, and appears to be in 
danger of become self-reinforcing. An ostensible concern about ‘foreign’ interference in 
domestic political affairs has in the process become a proxy for restricting the power and 
influence of the non-government sector more generally. The danger of an emergent ‘anti-
NGO’ norm is clear, but it is also opening up new debates, about double standards especially, 
for corporates as against NGOs. The new constraints, and contestation over them, has the 
potential to become the vehicle for new political forces and agendas. One very good example 
is in India, where the government’s arbitrary attack on environmentalists has served to both 
delegitimize the government and highlight environmental concerns (Talukdar, this Issue). 
The backlash in Australia, as noted, is having a similar impact. The recent history of failed 
attempts to constrain NGO advocacy in Australia, as outlined in the following section, 
suggests the government is surprisingly vulnerable on this issue.  
Australian Contexts 
In the Australian context non-corporate NGOs are regulated in a variety of ways. 
Membership-based associations can be created informally, but to enter into contracts, 
including to be insured for as an organisation for public events or as an employer, they need 
to become a legal entity. For this, associations apply for status as a ‘cooperative’ or as an 
‘incorporated body’. This does not come with limitations on political expression, though it 
does require organisations to be accountable to a membership, and report on finances to the 
Office for Fair Trading. One issue for incorporated bodies is that while Board members are 
not individually liable for debts they remain exposed to vexatious and politically-driven 
allegations of wrong-doing, such as defamation and libel. To minimise this, some 
organisations choose instead to be constituted as not-for-profit companies – which can offer 
greater protection for Board members in terms of liability, but can also prevent Boards from 
being challenged by, and being accountable to, any formal membership. Not-for-profit 
companies pay some forms of tax, but, as discussed below, are free from the widening range 
of governmental constraints being imposed on NGOs. 
Limitations on political expression are indeed much more explicit for NGOs that seek 
status as charitable organisations, whether as incorporated bodies or not-for-profits (NfP). 
Charitable status exempts an NGO or NfP from income tax and fringe benefits tax, and from 
tax on sales and investments; there is also a range of exemptions from State taxes. Charitable 
status can also be very important for organisations that rely on grants from charitable 
foundations and other tax-deductable trust funds. Until recently, charities in Australia were 
required to demonstrate, under the British-based common law of charities, that they did not 
have a ‘dominant political purpose’. A disqualifying dominant political purpose could be 
determined from an organisation’s practices as well as from its constitution, the rationale 
being that a dominant political purpose was by definition non-charitable.  
The common law requirement was lifted with the 2010 AidWatch case (see CCS 
Journal 3(3S) 2011). The case established that, under Australian constitutional law, charities 
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could have a dominant purpose of influencing and engaging in public ‘"agitation" for 
legislative and political changes’ (High Court 2010, para 45). The decision applied the right 
to freedom of political communication in Australia, which the Australian High Court had 
previously defined as a constitutional precondition for representative democracy. In the 
Aid/Watch case the Court found that ‘the generation by lawful means of public debate … 
itself is a purpose beneficial to the community’, adding that ‘in Australia there is no general 
doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes "political objects"’ (High Court 2010, 
paras 47 and 48).  
The judgement was later expressed in the 2013 Charities Act, which recognises that any 
charity with aims ‘beneficial to the general public’ can have a sole purpose of: ‘promoting or 
opposing a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice in the Commonwealth, 
a State, a Territory or another country’ (CoA 2013, s.12.1.l). Under the Act charities may not 
have ‘the purpose of engaging in, or promoting activities that are unlawful or contrary to 
public policy’ (public policy here refers to the constitutional system and the rule of law). Nor 
can charities have a ‘purpose of promoting or opposing’ political parties or candidates for 
office, though they may distribute information and advance debate through assessments, 
critiques and policy rankings (CoA 2013, s.11.a+b).  
At the time of the 2013 Act the ‘Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission’ 
(ACNC) was established to oversee the sector. Since 2014, the ACNC has had responsibility 
for disqualifying organisations that fail to comply with the political regulations, and has a 
‘compliance’ team that actively investigates complaints from the public about specific 
charities. The ACNC itself is known to have received politically-driven complaints about 
specific charitable bodes, and in 2016, arising from twenty-seven such complaints, officially 
initiated seven investigations, all of them into support for political candidates (ACNC 2017). 
This is a very small proportion of the 54,000 charitable organisations, but the threat of 
investigation alone produces compliance, and the ACNC is seeking the right to disclose 
targets of investigation to strengthen that effect (Knaus 2017). Yet, still, to date no 
organisation has been disqualified for breach of the political disqualifier, although there is 
political pressure to test the grey areas. In this respect a key issue may be whether 
‘promoting… unlawful’ civil disobedience, or support for a political party or candidate can 
be imputed as a ‘purpose’ under the 2013 Act, as against simply an activity. 
In Parliament the Opposition’s Liberal-National Coalition had opposed both the 2013 
Act and the creation of the ACNC. When it came to power under Prime Minister (PM) Tony 
Abbott the Coalition sought to abolish the ACNC, but a hard-fought public campaign led by 
the charitable sector ensured abolition was blocked in the Federal Senate (Crosbie 2017). The 
Government opted instead to change the ACNC ‘from within’, and in late 2017 it appointed 
Gary Johns as its new Commissioner. Gary Johns had made a career of challenging the 
legitimacy of advocacy NGOs. Formerly of the neoliberal think-tank, the Institute of Public 
Affairs, where he set up ‘NGOWatch’, Johns frequently criticised the charitable sector, 
including in his 2014 book, The Charity Ball, self-described as an attack on ‘political 
activism by state-funded charities’ (Johns 2014). He has also made specific demands that the 
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Government delete advocacy from the definition of public benefit under the 2013 Charities 
Act (which would violate the High Court position).   
Soon after the appointment of the new Commissioner the ACNC embarked on its five-
yearly independent review. In its submission to the review the ACNC Commissioner 
recommended two new purposes for the ACNC, namely to ‘promote the effective use of the 
resources of not-for-profit entities’, and to ‘enhance the accountability of not-for-profit 
entities to donors, beneficiaries and the public’ (ACNC 2018). These would be in addition to 
the existing three purposes, namely to maintain ‘public trust’ in the sector, to ‘support and 
sustain’ it, and to reduce regulatory ‘red tape’. No evidence was presented by the ACNC that 
the charitable sector was failing to effectively use its resources, nor that it was unaccountable, 
or that the existing purposes did not adequately cover the two proposed additional 
responsibilities. Peak sector organisations condemned the proposal as ‘bizarre overreach’, 
suggesting the ACNC was planning to regulate against what it may deem ‘ineffective’ use of 
resources, namely political advocacy (Karp 2018b).  
At the same time, with the question of charitable status relatively settled, attempts to 
undermine NGO advocacy had shifted into the field of ‘Deductable Gift Recipient’ (DGR) 
status. DGR status allows an organisation, usually a charity, to collect tax-deductible 
donations from the general public. Tax-deductible donations are an important source of 
revenue for the NGO sector. 28,000 organisations are registered, and DGR donations reduce 
tax revenue by a total of about $1.3billion (Treasury 2017). Organisations apply to be placed 
on a DGR register relevant to their sector and must comply with its particular conditions. The 
five registers are held in variety of Federal Departments, and from mid-2019, were to be 
transferred to the ACNC, which in December 2017 was granted additional funding to 
‘improve governance, reduce complexity and boost integrity’ of DGR (Michael 2017, p.1).   
Leading up to this decision there was a series of reviews of DGR status. In 2015 the 
Environment Minister established an Inquiry into the Register of Environmental 
Organisations (REO) under the Government-controlled House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on the Environment. The inquiry was focused on the definition of 'environmental 
organisation' in the REO and whether or not there should be a requirement to engage in ‘on-
ground environmental works’. It received 685 submissions and held a number of public 
hearings, including one in Sydney in October 2015, where a lively public demonstration was 
held by about 500 people to highlight the impacts on advocacy. The Inquiry recommended 
the Register be transferred to the Tax Office, that organisations be required to submit annual 
reviews, and undertake a quarter of their expenditure on ‘environmental remediation work’ 
(rather than advocacy); further, it recommended that organisations on the REO should be 
made responsible for the unlawful activities of members and ‘others without formal 
connections to the organisation’ (CoA 2016).  
In early 2017 Treasury initiated its own inquiry into DGR status, issuing a discussion 
paper on ‘Tax Deductible Gift Recipient Reform Opportunities’ (Treasury 2017). The paper 
made a bid to bring DGR registers into the Tax Office (which has a prime responsibility for 
maximizing revenues), and to more closely police access to DGR, including to delimit the 
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scope for advocacy, especially under the Register for Environmental Organisations. There are 
already indirect political restrictions embedded in a number of DGR registers, which require 
organisations to be engaged in direct provision as their predominant purpose. This is the case 
for the register of ‘Public Benevolent Institutions’, held at the ATO and later at the ACNC, 
which requires a PBI to ‘have benevolent relief as its main purpose’: PBI’s may only be 
engaged in ‘ancillary or incidental’ advocacy (ACNC 2016). This means that welfare 
advocacy organisations, for instance, cannot claim DGR status under the PBI. In this case, 
DGR status assists in addressing the symptoms of poverty, not its causes. The PBI is 
probably the most restrictive of the several DGR funds, although others have specific 
limitations. The ‘Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme’, for instance, which falls under the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, requires that organisations deliver ‘overseas aid 
activities’ (DFAT 2016). Under the scheme, aid can be used to address the causes of poverty, 
in the form of development assistance, as well as its symptoms, through direct humanitarian 
relief, and aid may flow to overseas advocacy organisations with the proviso they not be 
agents of political parties. 
The Treasury paper proposed a specific revision to the DGR REO. For an organisation 
to be on the REO it must be engaged in ‘the protection of the environment’, which may 
include ‘the provision of information or education, or the carrying on of research’ (Treasury 
2017). Advocacy for policy change, as it relates to the environment, is not explicitly defined 
as a purpose, but neither is it ruled out. In its paper, the Treasury floated the proposal from 
the Standing Committee on the Environment that environmental organisations be required to 
engage in ‘environmental works’ in order to be eligible for DGR status (Treasury 2017). Its 
effect would have been to disqualify organisations from accessing DGR that had a 
predominant or sole purpose of engaging in political advocacy, and was widely criticized by 
a range of NGOs. Treasury also suggested that there should be new requirements for DGR 
recipients to report to the ACNC to ensure their advocacy activities did not fall foul of the 
Charities Act.  
In the event, with over 2,500 submissions to the Inquiry, the status quo was maintained. 
In late 2017 the Government announced it would not ‘mandate a level of remediation by 
environmental organisations’, and instead of transferring administration of DGR registers to 
the Tax Office, it placed them under the ACNC. Further, rather than seek to directly police 
forms of advocacy, it announced the ACNC would simply report political expenditure by 
charities to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). In another climb-down, the 
Government revoked earlier legislation that would have limited overseas expenditure by 
charities (the ‘in Australia’ rule) (O’Dwyer 2017). 
The debate exposed the need to more clearly entrench the advocacy as a public benefit 
and charitable purpose in the DGR registers. Arguably, any requirement to limit activities to 
the direct provision of services undermines debate for ‘legislative and political changes’, 
chills democracy, and is potentially unconstitutional. It would be possible to simply carry 
across the Charity Law provisions into the various DGR Registers, as part of the ‘unfinished 
business’ of establishing the specifically Australian constitutional right to freedom of 
political communication in the regulation of DGR status. Indeed, given the public benefit of 
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all charities, extending access to DGR status to the whole sector would by definition be in the 
public interest (this was proposed by some agencies at the time). This would dramatically cut 
‘red tape’, a key responsibility of the ACNC. Such a tax cut for donors to the charitable 
sector would arguably be of much greater economic benefit than the Government’s proposed 
(much larger) tax cut to corporations. The impacts in terms of lost revenue would likely be 
more-than compensated-for through a resultant expansion in economic activity associated 
with the charitable sector. The impacts in terms of enhanced community well-being would be 
extensive.  
The ‘Foreign Interference’ Legislation 
In 2017 the Australian Government introduced a raft of proposals to curtail ‘foreign 
interference’ in the Australian political system; these dovetail with on-going measures to 
curtail public advocacy by domestic NGOs. The foreign influence legislation comes in three 
forms. First, there is proposed legislation requiring organisations that seek to exert ‘political 
or government influence’, and which also have any links with overseas political 
organisations, to register their interests and report publicly any donations or communication 
(CoA 2017b). Second, under ‘Electoral Legislation’, there is a proposed direct ban on any 
overseas funding to NGOs engaged in ‘political activities’, ostensibly to prevent foreign 
funders influencing electoral outcomes (CoA 2017a). And third, there is a series of changes 
to ‘National Security’ legislation which seek to ban ‘foreign interference’ directly (CoA 
2017c). These proposals, and the debate around them, are discussed in turn.  
(i) Naming Agents of Foreign Influence 
The question of ‘foreign interference’ in Australian politics has opened up a new front in the 
battle for and against advocacy NGOs. As noted, the current period of great-power rivalry, 
set in the context of an unprecedented interlocking of informational systems under 
globalisation, facilitates new forms of consensual paranoid nationalism.  Not unlike the 
mobilisation of anti-Communist states against their internal ‘fifth column’, the ‘enemy 
within’, the current political hysteria over political interference could enable a whole new raft 
of limitations on the democratic process. In interesting ways this is an instance of ‘geopolitics 
as usual’, a conflict between global elites, vying for influence. The political dynamic can be 
unstable. There are, not least, deep contradictions, with would-be nationalists creating new 
alliances of convenience, for instance, between Russia and the Brexit campaign.  
In Australia the debate about foreign interference came into focus after the 2016 
election on the issue of electoral donations. Following concerns at the manipulation of the 
2016 US election, a political consensus emerged about the need to revisit the issue of political 
interference in Australian elections. This was manifest most clearly at the Federal Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, which in September 2016 established an Inquiry 
into ‘all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election its inquiry into issues arising 
from the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election’. The Inquiry quickly became focused on the 
issue of political donations and in March 2017 released an ‘Interim Report’ on foreign 
political donations (CoA 2017d). This Report, and the ensuing legislation on regulating 
‘foreign donations’ are discussed in the next section.  
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At the same time as seeking to regulate donations the Government introduced 
legislation designed make transparent ‘foreign influence’. The proposals have received 
relatively little public scrutiny, possibly because they entail ‘political transparency’ rather 
than a direct prohibition or limitation on political activity. The Inquiry into the proposed 
legislation, under the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security received only 64 
submissions, and little media exposure. Yet the legislation proposed a major change in the 
regulation of political activity in Australia, which is likely to have a range of unanticipated 
effects. Like many of the schemes in other parts of the world, notably in Russia and the US 
for instance, the proposed legislation would require individuals and organisations to disclose 
of international political relationships. Such relationships would be ‘registered’, with details 
of the activities made public.  
The legislation is remarkably broad (see CoA 2017b). It requires any individual or 
organisation undertaking activities ‘on behalf of a foreign principal’, to register as an agent of 
‘foreign influence’. Acting ‘on behalf of’ encompasses any joint arrangement, including 
collaboration or funding. A ‘foreign principal’ is defined as anybody who is not an Australian 
citizen or permanent resident. A ‘registrable arrangement’ may include any kind or 
arrangement, written or unwritten, and may or may not entail any activity. The political 
activity itself may be to influence a section of the public, not simply the government. All 
activities must be reported to the registry, and may be released to the public. Non-compliance 
carries a heavy prison term, which could conceivably be imposed, for instance, ‘on a person 
seeking a meeting without registering as an agent of foreign influence’ (ACFID 2018). 
The upshot is that all organisations with any international linkages will either cease 
those undertakings or register as the agent of a ‘foreign principal’. Such a designation clearly 
carries with it a range of negative associations, what the Australian Council for International 
Development calls an ‘inherent reputational risk’, which directly undermines the legitimacy 
of organization or individual (ACFID 2018). The ACNC raised similar concerns, suggesting 
it is possible that: ‘…where a charity is part of a wider family of charities… which has links 
to an international grouping of entities, the charity may be required to register… should the 
group all decide to draw attention to the same transboundary issue, for example wealth and 
income inequality, or global environmental issues’ (ACNC 2018, p.3). As a result of these 
and other pressures, the ACNC stated that ‘it is likely charities will be less inclined to engage 
in public discourse which is an important element of charitable activity and purpose’ (ACNC 
2018, p.1). Stressing that foreign ties should generally be encouraged, not penalized, the Law 
Council of Australia recommended a focus on the ‘recipients of foreign influence’, rather 
than on those said to be agents of it (Law Council 2018); it also emphasized the failings of 
the US approach under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which was cited as the model for 
the broader Australian approach. 
The exemptions in the proposed legislation are themselves highly revealing. The 
proposed legislation is principally targeted at NGOs and individuals (though some NGOs are 
exempted, such as in the aid, humanitarian, legal, media and religious sectors). Unlike its US 
counterpart, the Australian model creates a blanket exemption for business entities registered 
in Australia, including wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational companies, thereby 
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rendering it largely ineffectual. Australian-based companies with international commercial 
dealings are also exempted provided the international relationship is business-related 
(although some ‘sensitive’ business dealings are not exempted, such as in public 
infrastructure, defence and national security). In its submission to the Inquiry, the 
Community Council drew attention to these imbalances in the application of ‘transparency’, 
highlighting the escape-clause for corporations, noting it would allow ‘any foreign company 
to engage in any activity in support of their international commercial interests, but seeks to 
restrict most others’ (Community Council 2018, p.5). This likely discriminatory impact 
reflects the underlying political drivers of the overall ‘foreign interference’ package (and may 
be its undoing). 
(ii) Banning Foreign Political Donations  
The issue of political donations raises the question of who or what is defined as a political 
actor in the electoral process, and how their role is distinguished, if at all. The key 
recommendation in the Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry’s Interim Report was the 
implementation of an across-the-board blanket ‘prohibition on donations from foreign 
citizens and foreign entities to Australian registered political parties, associated entities and 
third parties’ (CoA 2017d, Recommendation 3). This approach stemmed from opinion, not 
evidence: as the Committee stated, it was ‘of the opinion political entities, be they parties, 
associated entities, third parties or other actors should all be subject to the same rules’. The 
problem with this ‘level playing field’ approach is that the three sets of ‘players’ are quite 
different entities and by definition ‘play by their own rules’. As Staples has pointed out, 
‘politicians and their parties form governments, and governments have the executive power 
to enact legislation that materially advantages or disadvantages organisations and individuals; 
she adds that, in contrast, civil society cannot pass legislation… it is the engine of ideas in 
our democracy’ (Staples 2017). A consortium of ‘peak’ charitable NGOs, in responding to 
the Interim Report, made a similar point, stating ‘there is a categorical difference between 
political parties and charities’, from ‘a risk mitigation perspective, there is no argument for 
applying the same restrictions to charities as are applied to political parties’ (Charities 
Consortium 2017). Imposing the ban across the board has the effect of writing ‘rules’ for 
political parties and extending these across civil society as a whole. This does not reflect the 
ways in which these organisations are treated currently, as distinct entities with distinct 
purposes and responsibilities. Nor does it reflect their purposes. 
The Australian Electoral Commission defines the three sets of entities – political 
parties, their affiliates and third parties – as potential ‘participants in the electoral process’, 
but does not suggest they should be treated the same (AEC 2018). Within liberal democracy, 
political parties have a very particular role. Donations to political parties can enable them to 
gain access to political power and, hence, can have a corrupting influence. Reflecting this, 
they are subject to specific forms of regulation, for instance as regards transparency, that 
reflect the role of political parties in the political process. There is considerable debate about 
whether or how to ‘keep money out of politics’, or simply to ensure the public can find out 
where political parties source their funds. Counter to this is the strong incentive for party 
political donors to conceal their donations, for instance by channeling them via obscured 
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‘associated entities’ (see Guardian 2018). The debate about party political funding reflects 
the particular role of parties in the system, as representative bodies seeking to win elections 
and form government. Yet, increasingly it spills over into debates about the regulation of 
party affiliates, and wider NGO players, defined as ‘third party’ participants by the AEC.  
Expenditure by affiliates of political parties may be used to garner votes for the 
affiliated party – but also may not. This hinges on the definition of ‘affiliation’: some trade 
unions for instance are officially ‘affiliated’ to the ALP, but that does not mean that all their 
political activity, and all their income, for instance in the form of membership dues, is 
directed at promoting the electoral prospects of the ALP. Affiliated non-party organisations 
have multiple purposes, and it may be difficult to distinguish party-political purposes, and 
this reflects the fact that they are not solely or largely devoted to electoral gain. They are, as 
such, distinct types of organization, different from political parties. 
When it comes to ‘third-party’ political players, the scope of interference in the 
electoral process is even less clear. There is no necessary link to the political process as 
reflected in an affiliation for instance. Yet clearly there are many ‘third party’ bodies which 
spend considerable amounts of money, both during and outside elections, to influence voters. 
Expenditure by business associations is a good example. Such associations do not support all 
political parties equally and they do regularly mount public campaigns, for or against specific 
government agendas, and are funded to do so from corporate donations. The resulting 
expenditure is often directly ‘political’ and has a bearing on the electoral process. Yet these 
‘third party’ players have a distinct role where they act as ‘political entities’; crucially they do 
not seek votes as parties do, nor do they declare a particular affiliation. 
As noted, third party organisations and affiliated bodies are variously constituted as 
incorporated bodies, charities, cooperatives, not-for-profit companies, mutuals or for-profit 
companies. Each of these types of entity has distinct characteristics and purposes, and often 
its own regulatory frameworks. All are fundamentally different from political parties. 
Charitable organisations are a good example. As noted, charities have a specific regulatory 
regime under the ACNC, through the 2013 Charities Act. Importantly, the Act recognizes that 
engagement of charities in the political process to influence legislative outcomes is in itself a 
public benefit. Foreign donations that help charities advance their political advocacy, and 
thus advance public benefit, should be obviously be welcomed, and certainly not restricted.  
The Federal Inquiry’s insistence that all political players should be treated equally flies in the 
face of their very different roles and responsibilities. Most important, while there may be 
concerns about the influence of overseas donations on political parties, with anecdotal 
evidence to support such concerns, there is no in-principle reason why such donations to 
‘third party’ organisations such as charities should be curtailed. The Inquiry heard some 
anecdotal evidence of violation of requirements on political activity, for instance as presented 
by the Minerals Council of Australia in relation to environmental charities, issues which 
already which come under the ACNC remit (MCA 2017). There was no sector-wide evidence 
offered, nor provided, and no claim that any current disqualifying activity could not be dealt-
with by the ACNC. Despite this, the Committee took the view that foreign funding of 
76  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.1, 2018 
 
political activity in Australia, including charitable advocacy, by definition undermines 
national sovereignty: it stated simply that ‘only those with a direct standing interest [should] 
participate in Australian democracy’. The problem for the Committee was that political 
advocacy is already recognised as having a public benefit, and that there is no reason why 
such advocacy cannot be funded by overseas donations. In fact, insofar as foreign donations 
advance public benefit, they should be encouraged, not banned or otherwise restricted.  
In late December 2017, the Inquiry’s recommendations surfaced in the proposed 
Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Bill (CoA 
2017a). The Inquiry’s remit was extended to address the proposals and through this process 
considerable evidence has been provided on the likely impact of the proposed ban on foreign 
donations, especially for ‘third parties’. The sector has used the political process to digest and 
publicise what is proposed, and the Committee’s hearing and submission process have 
become a lightning-rod for concerns. In late 2017, for instance, a range of ‘peak’ 
organisations, including the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), the 
Australian Council for Social Service, the Human Rights Law Centre and the Community 
Council, established a ‘Save Our Charities’ campaign ‘united in opposing the Federal 
Government's attempt to undermine the benefits many Australians receive from philanthropy 
and to silence their voices’ (ACFID 2017b; Slezak 2017). Even the ACNC, under its new 
Commissioner, raised serious concerns about the ‘unnecessary regulatory burden’, stating the 
penalties for non-compliance would discourage qualified staff and Directors; it also cited 
legislative ’inconsistencies’, in terms of constraining ‘allowable political activity’ under 
charities law, ‘reducing the avenues available for them to achieve their charitable purpose’ 
(ACNC 2018b, pp.1-2) 
The proposed legislative arrangement is indeed highly complex, and backed by 
extensive sanctions. The key point is that under it foreign funding for any ‘political purpose’ 
will be criminalized (with a penalty of up to ten years in jail for the financial controllers of 
organisations). ‘Political purpose’ is broadly defined to include ‘public expression… of views 
on an issue that is, or is likely to be before electors in an election’ (replicating the definition 
for the reporting of ‘political expenditure’ to the AEC, as previously expanded under 2017 
legislation). As it cannot be predicted what issues will arise in an election, this essentially 
covers any and all forms of political advocacy. Organisations with such political purposes are 
required to register as ‘political campaigners’ if their ‘political expenditure’ is over $100,000 
annually, or if they are charities, as ‘third party campaigners’ with ‘political expenditure’ 
above $13,500.  
Designation as a ‘campaigner’ may have serious consequences for an organisation, in 
terms of ‘delegitimizing’ political comment (compounded by the requirement to disclose the 
party-political affiliations of senor staff; see HRLC 2018, p.8). Further, the legislation 
proposes to widen the AEC’s definition of ‘associated entity’ to any organization that spends 
funds predominantly to oppose the policies of a registered political party or to ‘benefit’ 
another party (and, interestingly, any association can be ‘inferred from negative campaign 
techniques’) (CoA 2017, p.14; CoAe 2017, p.21). Depending on how this is implemented 
(and tested in the courts), many advocacy NGOs could find themselves linked to a political 
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party. The AEC does not currently have powers to infer party political association: AEC 
designation of an NGO or INGO as having a party political association would have a direct 
and probably negative impact. Importantly, the Bill shifts the burden of proof on these issues: 
organisations have to prove they do not have political purposes as defined by the Act in order 
not to be registered.   
Perhaps most important, under the Act’s foreign funding rules, it will become 
imperative for all ‘third party’ organisations that are in any way involved in public advocacy 
to distinguish between Australian and non-Australian donations. Political campaigners will 
not be permitted to receive foreign donations; charities, unions and ‘third party’ campaigners 
will have to ‘ring-fence’ foreign donations to ensure they are not used for ‘political 
purposes’. Under the legislation all donors giving more than $250 annually to a ‘third party’ 
involved in advocacy will have to produce a statutory declaration or otherwise establish their 
status as an ‘allowable donor’. For large donations, above $13,500, details of the donors will 
be published by the AEC, including names and addresses of trustees.  
The effect of this (and it is highly likely this is the intended effect) is that third party 
organisations involved in political advocacy will be forced to either cease seeking public 
donations or vacate the political field. In either case, in aggregate, as the ACNC points out, ‘It 
is likely that there will be less funds available for charities to undertake advocacy work’ 
(ACNC 017b, p.7). This does not just apply to charities but to any organisation seeking to be 
engaged in the political process: as the Human Rights Law Centre points out, organisations 
will have to ‘choose between political advocacy and international funding’ (Karp 2018a; see 
also ACFID 2017a). Choosing political advocacy will incur a wide range of funding and 
disclosure obligations that are not only onerous but will bring with them the significant risk 
of imprisonment or the imposition of large fines. The legislation thereby creates new 
incentives, one might say imperatives, to keep out of politics and to exit civil society. In the 
process the Australian democratic process would be dramatically circumscribed.  
By February 2018, some of the Government’s key allies were publicly denigrating the 
proposed legislation. As noted, the ACNC itself had been critical. Ironically enough, the 
Institute for Public Affairs condemned the legislation in late January 2018 as a ‘dangerous 
restriction on freedom of speech’ (Koziol 2018). The Federal Parliamentary Library observed 
in February that ‘the perception in the not-for-profit community is that the end result of the 
provisions will be to make it difficult for not-for-profit organisations to advocate on issues 
that are subject to political debate’, adding, ‘it appears that the Bill will struggle to gain the 
support of the broader community’ (Muller 2018, p.28). In this context, political debate 
became focused on whether or not the legislation could be successfully amended. Regardless 
of the outcome, the episode demonstrates how the threat of ‘foreign interference’ is being 
recruited into the political struggle over political advocacy in Australia. This is already 
having unanticipated impacts, in terms of the political backlash, and may have further to run 
in terms of the emergence of new political agendas.   
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(iii) Criminalising Foreign Political Influence 
Finally, and briefly, the third tranche of proposed ‘foreign interference’ legislation proposed 
to create a new class of criminal offences related to foreign intimidation and ‘threats’. These 
appeared as part of a wider strengthening of offences in relations to ‘treason, espionage…and 
related offenses’, thereby conflating ‘foreign interference’, including ‘collaboration’, with 
much more serious offenses of spying and treason.  
The actual measures broaden offences and create enhanced penalties if they are 
committed ‘in collaboration with a Foreign Principal’ (CoA 2017c). The definition of 
‘sabotage’, for instance, is extended to include actions directed at public infrastructure, 
including any ‘facility’ that provides or relates to providing the public with utilities….of any 
kind’ (whether privately or publicly owned). Collaborating with a foreign principal to 
interfere with such infrastructure, that ’limits or prevents access to it or any part of it by 
persons who are ordinarily entitled to access it’, carries a maximum penalty of 20 years (CoA 
2017c, pp.6-10) This means, for example, that an individual engaged in blockading a coal-
fired power station, seeking to close it down perhaps in collaboration with INGOs on an 
international day of action on climate change, can be imprisoned for the equivalent standard 
non-parole imprisonment period for committing murder.  
The new specific proposed offences for foreign interference were no less punitive. 
Covert, deceptive or threatening behaviour to exert political influence ‘in collaboration with a 
foreign principal’ carries a penalty of 20 years; seeking to influence another person, described 
as ‘the target’, in the exercise of their political rights or duties, while failing to disclose 
‘collaboration with a foreign principal’ carries a penalty of 15 years (CoA 2017:32-36).  
Surprisingly, this legislation, which is much more extensive than the provisions on 
foreign funding, has received little public attention. There were thirty-eight submissions to 
the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and minimal media attention beyond the 
possible impacts on journalism and wider ‘free speech’. Of the submissions that were 
received, there was a tendency to focus on one or other aspect, rather than the whole package. 
The Australian Human Rights Law Centre and the Australian Human Rights Commission, for 
instance, both focused on secrecy provisions; the Law Council did offer a series of 
recommendations across the board, including measures to lessen the impact of the ‘foreign 
interference’ provisions, stating it did ‘not support’ the new set of offences in their current 
form (Law Society 2018b: 50).  
Concluding: Shifting the Focus to Corporates?  
The recent history of attempts to delimit political advocacy in Australia has established a 
pattern of contestation that in some respects has expanded the field. Some rights to advocacy 
have been strengthened – though of course in other respects civil and political rights have 
dramatically narrowed (for instance in relation to ‘terror’ offences). Central to this has been 
the political agency of NGOs, both international and domestic, in defending and expanding 
Australia’s ‘civic space’. As with previous attempts to restrict political activity by NGOs in 
Australia, we may yet see new demands coming onto the political table as a result of the 
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recent ‘foreign interference’ proposals, which are increasingly looking like another instance 
of political overreach. Reflecting the international debate on this issue and the self-evident 
drivers and bias of the proposed legislation, the issues are most likely to centre on the 
question of corporate political activity.  
The attempt to impose new tighter regulations on NGOs has served to highlight the 
absence of obligations for corporations, which are in large part free of any limitations on 
political activity or indeed ‘interference’. It is often argued that charities are subjected to 
specific regulations, around political activity for instance, by virtue of their special tax-
exempt status. Corporations also have special tax-exempt status, in terms of limited liability 
for instance, but it is noteworthy that there are no blanket requirements around political 
activity for corporations. Some very narrow exceptions exist – for instance for property 
developers in NSW, which are not permitted to donate to political parties. This restriction 
was upheld by the High Court in 2015, in the McCloy case, as a reasonable and proportionate 
limitation on the constitutional requirement for freedom of political communication. In its 
judgement, the High Court emphasised that ‘equality of opportunity to participate in the 
exercise of political sovereignty is an aspect of the representative democracy guaranteed by 
our Constitution’, adding, ‘the risk to equal participation posed by the uncontrolled use of 
wealth may warrant legislative action to ensure, or even enhance, the practical enjoyment of 
popular sovereignty’ (High Court 2015, para 45).  
Such restrictions could be justifiably extended, for instance to mining, pharmaceutical 
or tobacco companies, where abuses are already self-evident. Beyond this, there is a need for 
corporate-wide obligations, similar to those required by the High Court for charities, given 
considerable evidence that corporations are choosing to use their revenues to influence the 
electoral process, either directly or via industry associations. As noted, the recent proposals 
on regulating foreign interference have noticeably sought to exempt corporations, yet 
internationally-networked corporations regularly seek to influence the political process and 
are no less ‘political actors’ than the charitable sector. The Minerals Council of Australia 
(MCA), for instance, plays a major role in influencing Australian political outcomes, not least 
with its 2010 campaign to defeat PM Kevin Rudd’s proposed Resource Super Profit Tax. The 
MCA’s ‘Keep Mining Strong’ media campaign reportedly cost $22m (though in that year the 
MCA only reported $4m in political expenditure to the AEC) (ABC 2010). The resources tax 
subsequently agreed by PM Gillard saved the largely foreign-owned sector $35b over ten 
years. Corporate players in Australia appeared to learn the lessons, with a subsequent spate of 
corporate-funded public campaigns targeting legislative proposals, often led by overseas-
owned companies (Cook 2013). 
Clearly, regulating political expenditure by civil society would have a serious 
dampening effect on democratic life; combining this with the existing ‘open cheque’ policy 
for business would further skew the political process. Political regulations are already in 
place for political parties, affiliated bodies and for charities. Given the special status of 
corporations, and their recent demonstrated capacity to influence the political process, it is 
reasonable to require corporations to adhere (at minimum) to the same standards on political 
interference as charities – that is, corporations should not be permitted to directly support or 
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oppose political parties or candidates for office, including through donations. As for charities, 
should they wish not to abide by such standards then their corporate status should be 
‘disqualified’. The raft of ‘foreign interference’ legislation inadvertently lays the groundwork 
for the development of political claims of this sort in Australia, that may address the 
prevailing and intensifying ‘risk to equal participation posed by the uncontrolled use of 
wealth’ (High Court 2015, para 45).  
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